Russia

Prisoners of the Caucasus. Charles King and Rajan Menon, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010, var. pages. "A pernicious mix of heavy-handed rule, corrupt governance, high unemployment, and militant Islam has reignited the Russian North Caucasus. Today, it is not only the old conflict zone of Chechnya but also its neighboring republics that are bordering on open civil war." READ MORE

The Resurgence of Russian Interests in Central Asia. Scott G Frickenstein, Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2010, 67-74. "In order to analyze Russia's policy toward Central Asia effectively, one must first understand the Soviet and Russian historical legacy in the region. Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia was initially indifferentborderline irritated, in fact- toward Central Asia. Not surprisingly, the region's fledgling nations looked for help elsewhere as they ventured out of the Soviet nest. Russia soon became aware that it had lost a great deal of influence in the region, but in the latter half of Près. Boris Yeltsin's tenure, it regained very little clout since Central Asians perceived a disconnect between Russia's 'walk' and 'talk.' The era of Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, witnessed both enhanced focus and rigorous reassertion of Russian authority in the region. For each of these three periods, this article analyzes the security, economic, and political aspects of Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia and concisely assesses the results of Russian efforts. Before concluding, it discusses two important developments during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, a period of assertive Russian foreign policy that is still unfolding." READ MORE

Non proliferation

Friends Don't Let Friends Proliferate. Scott Helfstein, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2010, pp. 281-308. "Scott Helfstein examines the efficacy of economic sanctions as a tool to counter nuclear proliferation. He argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, international cooperation is not a key determinant in sanction success. Instead, empirical evidence shows that sanctions have been effective at altering nuclear policies only when the sanction sender and target have had friendly relations." READ MORE

NATO Experts Hedge on Nuclear Posture. Oliver Meier, Arms Control Today, June 2010, pp. 36-38. "A report delivered by a group made up largely of diplomats and former officials on May 17 to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen does not give clear guidance on whether U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe should be withdrawn, saying that 'the Alliance should be prepared for in-depth consultations on the future role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy.' The group also recommends that NATO adopt the new negative security assurances contained in the recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report (see ACT, May 2010), saying that "NATO should endorse a policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." READ MORE

Stopping Proliferation Before It Starts. Gregory L. Schulte, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010, var. pages. "It is probably too late to convince North Korea and Iran to dismantle their nuclear programs. Rather than fixating on the proliferation they are unable to prevent, concerned countries should pay more attention to preventing proliferation to states that have not yet decided to build nuclear weapons." READ MORE

The North Korea Nuclear Problem: Sailing into Uncharted Waters. Evans Revere, American Foreign Policy Interests, May 2010, pp. 183 - 190. "A chilling assessment of the choices facing North Korea (and, by extension, the United States and its allies and partners) if it continues to defy the international community by insisting that it will keep its nuclear weapons." READ MORE

AfPak

Defining Success in Afghanistan. Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J Alexander Thier, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010, var. pages. "Since 2001, the West has tried to build a strong centralized government in Afghanistan. But such an approach fits poorly with the country's history and political culture. The most realistic and acceptable alternative models of governance are decentralized democracy and a system of internal mixed sovereignty." READ MORE

China’s Caution on Afghanistan–Pakistan. Andrew Small, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, pp. 81-97. "The ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan looks like a prime candidate for closer cooperation between the United States and China. There are various broadly shared interests in combating terrorism, containing rising extremism, and supporting the stability of both states. With its extensive influence in Pakistan and substantial economic capacity, Beijing has important assets to bring to the table. In practice, however, efforts to achieve convergence have proved frustrating. Differences run deep over how to address the extremist threat and the broader geopolitics of the region. And as is true of its foreign policy elsewhere, China pursues a relatively narrow conception of its interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than supporting a more widely shared set of goals." READ MORE

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Gaining a Grip, Gareth Price, The World Today, July 2010, var. pages. "All eyes are on Afghanistan. The American troop build-up continues, while the British look forward to leaving. Across the border in Pakistan, a convoy supplying those soldiers is torched close to the capital. Security there is looking increasingly unsteady too; various Taliban groups are gaining a grip. Time to keep an eye on Pakistan as well." READ MORE

Managing the Commons

From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace: The Colonizing of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik. Mary McEvoy Manjikian, International Studies Quarterly, June 2010, pp. 381-401. "From the earliest years of the Internet's creation, cyberspace has been distinguished from other types of political space because of three unique qualities: (i) its ability to mobilize users, particularly 'outsiders' including those who have not been easily included in political systems using conventional means; (ii) its ability to quickly provide large quantities of information of uncertain or unregulated quality; and (iii) its ability to shrink distances between users, in some sense rendering conventional physical geography irrelevant. This paper presents three lenses for interpreting the significance of these developments: utopian, liberal, and realist. Evolving doctrines of cyberwarfare as put forth by China, Russia, and the United States in particular stress the ways in which cyberspace presents a unique security threat which may present greater advantages to nonstate actors engaged in unconventional warfare. Differing economic, political, and security policies derive from each lens." READ MORE

Promoting Security in Common Domains. Shawn Brimley, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, pp. 119-132. "The United States is at the beginning of a critical and lasting national security imperative—to prepare U.S. institutions and the American people for a set of cross-domain challenges in sea, air, space, and cyberspace that demand new thinking and innovative approaches." READ MORE

Sanctions

China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions. Willem van Kemenade, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010. pp. 99-114.  The EU, Israel, and United States have been conducting an intensive campaign of diplomatic skirmishes with Brazil, China, Turkey, and others over imposing sanctions on Iran to stop it from moving from enriching uranium to building nuclear weapons. The sanctions needed to be ‘‘crippling’’ according to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘‘massive’’ according to
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and ‘‘biting’’ according to Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel.1 Yet, an operational consensus had not been
obtained by May 2010. Some in the United States, particularly within Congress,
appear willing to be indiscriminate in hitting not only the core of the Iranian
regime but also the Iranian people, while Israel is defiantly planning a
potentially catastrophic military attack on Iran’s nuclear sites even without
the consent of the United States.2 On the other hand, Europeans want to be
more circumspect and focus on targeting the hard core of Iran’s regime rather
than its public. READ MORE

Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions. Tara Maller, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, pp. 61-79. The U.S. government has recently begun to emphasize the need for greater engagement with problem states. Proponents of this approach argue that diplomacy is necessary, even with these regimes. Critics, however, maintain that engagement with these regimes is tantamount to appeasement and signals acceptance of behavior that ought to be condemned. In their view, there is little
to be gained by talking to these states. Thus, diplomatic sanctions or sanctions
characterized by political disengagement are seen as a low-cost means of
isolating and delegitimizing regimes. Diplomatic sanctions, however, entail a number of often overlooked consequences for the United States. The potential costs of diplomatic
sanctions include not only a substantial loss of information and intelligence
on the target state, but also a reduction in communication capacity and a
diminished ability to influence the target state. Ironically, diplomatic sanctions
may even undermine the effectiveness of other coercive policy tools, such as
economic sanctions. These adverse effects ought to cause policymakers to
reassess the value of diplomatic isolation as a tool of foreign policy and recognize
the inherent value of diplomatic engagement. READ MORE

EU Issues

EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera? Rik Coolsaet, International Affairs, June 2010, pp. 857-873. Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11. Terrorism is solidly entrenched in Europe’s past. Throughout its history, many of its member states have experienced a wide variety of terrorism—left-wing, right-wing, separatist, social and
religious, domestic as well as international. The main characteristic of the counterterrorism approach in Europe has been to consider terrorism a crime, to be tackled through criminal law. Counterterrorism has long been confined within national
borders, aside from sporadic ad hoc cooperation in specific cross-border dossiers.
In the early 1970s, terrorism slowly entered the realm of the European
integration process.1 The first organized platform for European counterterrorist
cooperation was TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence
Internationale), created in 1976 by the EU ministers of justice and interior/home
affairs.2 Under this intergovernmental umbrella, a working group composed
of police and interior officials of the then ten European Community member
states dealt with the topics of terrorism, immigration and asylum. The first tentative
common threats assessments were produced, topics such as DNA genetic fingerprinting were broached and gradually the scope of the work grew. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, abolishing all internal borders between participating states in favour of a single external border, though not specifically dealing with terrorism, entailed stepped-up police, judicial and border cooperation throughout Europe. READ MORE

The Euro-Atlantic Brand. David Binder, Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 2010, pp. 12-17.
"Euro-Atlantic" as a political power brand name was employed possibly for the first time in a 1985 speech by Bettino Craxi, then president of the European Council, when he spoke about "Italy's Euro-Atlantic role." Its political usage was codified in the label Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a group formed in 1997 and which now numbers fifty "partner" governments. EAPC is the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. (The NACC was created as an adjunct to NATO six years earlier in the first flush of post–Cold War Europe.) Among EAPC partners are not only eleven far-flung (and non-Atlantic-riparian) governments of the former Soviet Union—from Armenia to Uzbekistan—but also the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. Russia itself is listed among the partners, although its leaders remain highly suspicious of the NATO parent. READ MORE

The EU Enlargement Policy and National Majority-Minority Dynamics in Potential European Union Members: The Example of Turkey. Laman Tasch, Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 2010, pp. 18-46. The absence of a universally accepted definition of minority and standardized mechanisms for minority protection presents challenges during the European Union (EU) accession process. The differences between definitions used by European policy makers and those used in candidate countries are evident in Turkey's journey to the EU. Cultural identity boundaries are dynamic, and emphasizing the protection of particular minority groups can be regarded as a minority-forging policy that places at risk the successful implementation of minority protection in the candidate country. READ MORE

Balancing, Bonding, and Balking: The European Union, the United States, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Christopher Hemmer, Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2010, pp. 47-60. The increasing resources, albeit largely financial, that the European Union has committed to the Israeli?Palestinian relationship has led to increasing calls for the EU to take a greater political role in the peace process. In this essay the potential role of the EU in the Israeli?Palestinian conflict is examined in relation to that of the United States. For the EU to play a more influential role in the peace process, neither a pure balancing nor a pure bonding strategy is likely to work. Instead, the most promising strategy for the EU would be a bonding strategy combined with a threat to balk, to simply withhold support from US initiatives if Europe's views are not taken into account. READ MORE