The Great Democracy Meltdown. Joshua Kurlantzick, The New Republic, May 19, 2011, var. pp.  "As the revolt that started this past winter in Tunisia spread to Egypt, Libya, and beyond, dissidents the world over were looking to the Middle East for inspiration. In China, online activists inspired by the Arab Spring called for a “jasmine revolution.” In Singapore, one of the quietest countries in the world, opposition members called for an “orchid evolution” in the run-up to this month’s national elections. Perhaps as a result, those watching from the West have been positively triumphalist in their predictions. The Middle East uprisings could herald “the greatest advance for human rights and freedom since the end of the cold war,” argued British Foreign Secretary William Hague. Indeed, at no point since the end of the cold war—when Francis Fukuyama penned his famous essay The End of History, positing that liberal democracy was the ultimate destination for every country—has there been so much optimism about the march of global freedom." READ MORE

Libya and the Responsibilities of Power.  Bruce D. Jones,  Survival, June-July 2011, pp. 51-60. "From the beginning of protests in Libya’s second city, Benghazi, the emerging international ‘semi-order’ has performed better than we might have anticipated. In the face of a civilian uprising and Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi’s threats to crush it, the UN Security Council moved swiftly to adopt sanctions and refer Gadhafi and key allies to the International Criminal Court, invoking the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept in Resolution 1970. This, combined with the Arab League’s call for imposition of a no-fly zone, created a sense of unity and resolve. Only the African Union dithered. Later, though, a 10–0–5 vote on Security Council Resolution 1973 to actually implement the responsibility to protect, through a no-fly zone and additional military action, showed underlying divisions. Some argued that abstentions rather than ‘no’ votes were a glass half full. Since the vote, sharp criticisms from Russia and India about of the West’s use of force, in public and in the Security Council, have amplified the sense of division." READ MORE

Perspective: North Africa’s Epochal Year of Freedom. Augustus Richard Norton and Ashraf el-Sherif, Current History, May 2011, pp. 201-203. "Uprisings in North Africa have electrified the world and inaugurated a new era in the region, but their outcomes are uncertain. The old order could yet prove resilient." READ MORE

Libya after Gadhafi. Saskia van Genugten, Survival, June-July 2011, pp. 61-74. "Libya lies between tunisia and Egypt, the two success stories, at least for now, of the Arab Awakening. But the Libyan story has been much darker. Colonel Muammar Gadhafi and his regime have put up a remarkable esistance, withstanding as of early May both external military intervention and significant internal defections. After more than four decades of authoritarian stability, the country’s future is unclear. Fears that Libya will become the next Somalia are probably over-blown, but even in the best case considerable difficulties lie ahead. Any democratic transition in Libya is likely to be protracted and fragile."  READ MORE

The Muslim Brotherhood Evolution: An Overview. Rachel  Ehrenfeld, American Foreign Policy Interests, March 2011 , pp. 69-85. "The mass demonstrations that brought down the Hosni Mubarak regime might not have been started by the Muslim Brotherhood, which successive Egyptian governments had banned since 1954, but that well-funded and organized opposition group was quick to take advantage of the popular protests. Their endorsement of the demonstrations and their active participation in them provided the Brotherhood with a legitimate voice in the emerging political leadership. The massive coverage of the uprising by the international media gave this Muslim fundamentalist global movement an excellent stage on which to enact its masquerade as a benign, freedom-loving organization. Looking for new alternatives to the old regime, the media and many political commentators have either ignored or deliberately misinformed the public about the real agenda of the group and the serious threat its rising influence poses to the West. Since its establishment in 1928, this secretive organization has frequently adopted new strategies, allowing it to grow and become a global organization with deep footholds in more than seventy countries. This article lays out the Brotherhood's agenda and highlights key points in the organization's evolution that has helped it to survive and pursue its mission to establish a global Islamic Caliphate." READ MORE

The Arab Revolutions for Dignity. Anouar Boukhars, American Foreign Policy Interests, March 2011, pp. 61-68. "Before the historic revolts transforming the Arab world today, it was an article of faith that radical Islamist revolutionaries would spearhead any challenge to the dictatorships that rule the Arab world. The millions of prodemocracy protesters braving riot squads and regime thugs have demolished such preconceptions. Although much can still go wrong, the clamor for freedom and justice that started in the small town of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia and exploded in Liberation Square in Cairo has shown that the impossible can happen. The Islamist boogeyman has neither engineered the revolutions for dignity and freedom nor dominated them. The Obama administration has so far demonstrated a new realism that realizes the failures of the old foreign policy model that saw Arab tyrants as guarantors of America's interests in the region. The temptation to contain the revolutionary fervor spreading through the region still exists within the administration, but there is also a growing realization that the time has come for redefining America's role in the Middle East." READ MORE

Political Order in Egypt. Francis Fukuyama, The American Interest, May/June, var. pages. "How Samuel Huntington helps us understand the Jasmine Revolutions. While academic political science has not had much to tell policymakers of late, there is one book that stands out as being singularly relevant to the events currently unfolding in Tunisia, Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries: Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, first published over forty years ago.1 Huntington was one of the last social scientists to try to understand the linkages between political, economic and social change in a comprehensive way, and the weakness of subsequent efforts to maintain this kind of large perspective is one reason we have such difficulties, intellectually and in policy terms, in keeping up with our contemporary world." READ MORE

The Heirs of Nasser. Michael Scott Doran, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, var. pages. "Not since the Suez crisis and the Nasser-fueled uprisings of the 1950s has the Middle East seen so much unrest. Understanding those earlier events can help the United States navigate the crisis today -- for just like Nasser, Iran and Syria will try to manipulate various local grievances into a unified anti-Western campaign." READ MORE

The Black Swan of Cairo. Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Blyth, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, var. pages.  "The upheavals in the Middle East have much in common with the recent global financial crisis: both were plausible worst-case scenarios whose probability was dramatically underestimated. When policymakers try to suppress economic or political volatility, they only increase the risk of blowups." READ MORE

Turmoil in the Arab World: Will Democracy Emerge from the “Arab Spring”? Roland Flamini, CQ Global Researcher, May 3, 2011, pp. 209-236. "Massive, largely peaceful demonstrations in January and February forced longtime autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt from power, including Hosni Mubarak, who had dominated Egypt for more than 30 years. Subsequently, protests erupted in at least a dozen other countries across the Arab world, several of which continue. Using social media to organize, young demonstrators have called for the removal of long-entrenched corrupt regimes, greater freedom and more jobs. They have been met with violent government crackdowns in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, while in Libya strongman Moammar Gadhafi is battling a ragtag rebel force backed by NATO. As the region reverberates with calls for change, scholars say some key questions must be answered: Will the region become more democratic or will Islamic fundamentalists take control? And will relations with the West and Israel suffer? Then on May 1, al Qaida chief Osama bin Laden was killed in a U.S. raid in Pakistan. Once, such news might have triggered anti-U.S. protests across the region. Now, it seemed, those bin Laden had tried to radicalize were more interested in jobs and freedom than in bin Laden's dream of a vast, new Muslin caliphate." READ MORE

Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies. Jack A. Goldstone, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, var. pages. "Revolutions rarely succeed, writes one of the world's leading experts on the subject -- except for revolutions against corrupt and personalist "sultanistic" regimes. This helps explain why Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak fell -- and also why some other governments in the region will prove more resilient." READ MORE

Demystifying the Arab Spring. Lisa Anderson, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, var. pages. "Why have the upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya followed such different paths? Because of the countries' vastly different cultures and histories, writes the president of the American University in Cairo. Washington must come to grips with these variations if it hopes to shape the outcomes constructively." READ MORE

The Rise of the Islamists. Shadi Hamid, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, var. pages. "The recent turmoil in the Middle East may lead to the Arab world's first sustained experiment in Islamist government. But the West need not fear. For all their anti-American rhetoric, today's mainstream Islamist groups tend to be pragmatic -- and ready to compromise if necessary on ideology and foreign policy." READ MORE

The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy. Ryan Lizza, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, var. pages. "Despite the realist tilt, Obama has argued from the start that he was anti-ideological, that he defied traditional categories and ideologies. In Oslo, in December of 2009, accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama said, “Within America, there has long been a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists—a tension that suggests a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values around the world.” The speech echoed Obama’s 2002 address to an antiwar demonstration in Chicago’s Federal Plaza. In Chicago, he had confounded his leftist audience by emphasizing the need to fight some wars, but not “dumb” ones, like the one in Iraq. In Oslo, he surprised a largely left-leaning audience by talking about the martial imperatives of a Commander-in-Chief overseeing two wars. Obama’s aides often insist that he is an anti-ideological politician interested only in what actually works. He is, one says, a 'consequentialist.'" READ MORE

The Ultimate Ally: The "realists" are wrong: America needs Israel now more than ever. Michael Oren, Foreign Policy, May/June 2011, var. pages. "The surveys prove that most Americans do not accept the argument that U.S. support for Israel provokes Islamic radicals or do not especially care even if it does. (...) That kind of popular foundation for the Israeli-American alliance is all the more important at a time of great upheaval in the Middle East. As Iran's malign influence spreads and Turkey turns away from the West, Israel's strategic value in the region, both to the United States and to pro-Western Arab governments, will surely increase. Following Hezbollah's recent takeover of Lebanon and the political turmoil in Egypt, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf, Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that is certain to remain stable and unequivocally pro-American. In Israel alone, the United States will not have to choose between upholding its democratic principles and pursuing its vital interests." READ MORE

Stability in the Middle East: The Other Side of Security. Find their worst grievances and deal with them. Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, Apr 11, 2011, var. pages. "National security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals that began in Tunis, and now play out from Pakistan to Morocco,. have highlighted the fact that national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. It is all too clear that the wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that limits the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as outside and extremist threats." READ MORE

America’s Fading Middle East Influence. Shmuel Bar, Policy Review, April 2011, var. pages. "The middle east has gone through eras of projection of power by external powers, and it has adapted to the balance of power between them. For over two decades, the United States has been the predominant superpower in the region and the main force in maintaining the status quo. However, today, the Middle East is undergoing a sea change. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were the result of developments within the countries themselves: deep economic and social malaise and the perception of the loss of domestic deterrence by ossified regimes led by aging leaders. However, the popular perception that the United States had abandoned its erstwhile allies to support those revolutions facilitated their spread to other theaters. This turnabout in American policy is not seen in the region as reflecting American power though intervention, but rather the decline of American power, manifested in a policy of “bandwagoning” after years of proactive American policy. Clearly, the decline of American projection of power in the region will have as profound an effect as the projection of American power had at its height." READ MORE

America and Egypt After the Uprisings. Marc Lynch, Survival, April/May 2011, pp. 31-42. "The United States had been calling for reform in Egypt for over a decade, to little avail. The regime, however unpopular, sclerotic, closed and isolated, seemed firmly in control and well-prepared to meet the challenges of new protests. After a decade of failed efforts to spark mass protest, few expected the demonstrations to catch fire as they did or for Egyptian stability to be seriously challenged. As protests mounted, however, the Obama administration quickly concluded privately that Mubarak could not survive and that American policy must be designed to broker a post-Mubarak outcome amenable to core American interests. The Obama administration’s reaction demonstrated a far different sensibility than that manifested by the George W. Bush administration. To the frustration of American pundits, Obama did not attempt to lead a protest movement which neither needed nor wanted his guidance. Instead, he focused American efforts on restraining the Egyptian military from using violence against protesters, demanding respect for universal rights, insisting that only Egyptians could choose Egypt’s leaders, and attempting to push for long-term, meaningful reform. The administration’s attempt to straddle its competing commitments inevitably enraged all sides: the Egyptian regime and Arab allies railed against American abandonment, Egyptian protesters and Arab public opinion complained of American indifference, and American critics demanded more vocal leadership." READ MORE

Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality? Gawdat Bahgat, Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 2011, pp. 27-40. "Since the early 2000s Iran's nuclear program has been a major focus of international and regional policy. Many policy makers and scholars have expressed their concern that if Iran "goes nuclear" other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, will follow suit. This author argues against this conventional wisdom. As a NATO member, Turkey is a special case. The analysis suggests that security is the main reason why countries pursue nuclear weapons. Egypt and Saudi Arabia (along with other Arab countries) have learned how to live with a perceived nuclear Israel. Iran with a nuclear capability, if it happens, would not pose a security threat to either Cairo or Riyadh. In short, the author argues that an Iran with nuclear capability will further destabilize the Middle East and will be a negative development, but it is not likely to make Egypt and Saudi Arabia 'go nuclear.'" READ MORE

Reflections on the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. Rashid Khalidi, Foreign Policy, Feb. 24, 2011, var. pages. "This is above all a moment of new possibilities in the Arab world, and indeed in the entire Middle East. We have not witnessed such a turning point for a very long time. Suddenly, once insuperable obstacles seem surmountable. Despotic regimes that have been entrenched across the Arab world for two full generations are suddenly vulnerable. Two of the most formidable among them -- in Tunis and Cairo -- have crumbled before our eyes in a matter of a few weeks. Another in Tripoli, one of the most brutal and repressive, is tottering at this moment. We are privileged to be experiencing what may well be a world historical moment, when what once seemed to be fixed verities vanish and new potentials and forces emerge. The same mainstream Western media that habitually conveys a picture of a region peopled almost exclusively by enraged, bearded terrorist fanatics who 'hate our freedom' has begun to show images of ordinary people peacefully making eminently reasonable demands for freedom, dignity, social justice, accountability, the rule of law, and democracy. Arab youth at the end of the day have been shown to have hopes and ideals not that different from those of the young people who helped bring about democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South, Southeast, and East Asia." READ MORE

What Resolution 242 Really Said. Arthur Goldberg, American Foreign Policy Interests,  January 2011 , pp. 41-46. "In recent months, there have been numerous reports in the media, including on the front page of The New York Times, claiming that the Obama administration was prepared to “formally endorse a Palestinian state based on the borders of Israel before the 1967 Middle East War.” Whether the underlying substance is true or not, virtually all of those stories are based on the premise that United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted after the Six-Day War, requires that Israel withdraw from all of the territories that it came to occupy as a result of that conflict. However, that is a misreading of both the text and its history, as Arthur J. Goldberg, the distinguished American jurist and statesman, who, while serving as United States ambassador to the United Nations at the time, played the primary role in facilitating the resolution's adoption, explained in the following essay, originally published in February 1988 in volume 11, number 1, of American Foreign Policy Interests. This valuable document is made available once again because, like much that has appeared in the pages of this journal over the years, it has retained a not insignificant relevance to contemporary policy debates." READ MORE

Obama in the Middle East: Why he Needs European Support. Amr Yossef, Sergio Fabbrini, European Political Science, March 2011, pp. 36-43. "Has the Obama administration opened a new era in the Middle East? The article argues that intentions and reality are still divergent. This is explained by several factors. Specific political contingencies in the region, the way in which the region's issues are interrelated and the domestic structure of US foreign policymaking, have all contributed to generate a situation of deadlock. The Obama administration and the reformers in the region, needs the active pressure of other international actors, starting with the EU, especially now that the latter and the US Middle East policies are significantly converging. The Middle East might be the site for testing a new transatlantic relationship." <READ MORE

Prophet Motive: Can Islam and capitalism work together? John Cassidy, The New Yorker, February 28, 2011, pp. 32-35. "After the revolution comes the test of governing. From Paris in 1789 to Cairo and Tunis in 2011, the task is the same: translating the euphoria of the uprising into lasting material progress. If the new governments of Egypt and Tunisia are to have any chance of satisfying the demands of the revolutionaries, they need to start out with an accurate assessment of what has been holding back their economies. But what if a major culprit is Islam itself? An influential line of analysis points to that conclusion." READ MORE

Ordinary Muslims: Power and Space in Everyday Life. Berna Turam, International Journal of Middle East Studies, January 2011, pp. 144-146. "Like other area studies, Middle East studies has an interdisciplinary scope, which enriches scholarly debates on Islamist movements, groups, and actors. However, while Middle East studies brings scholars from a wide range of academic backgrounds together, it is still predominantly represented by two major disciplines: political science and history. Relatively less attention is paid to what other disciplines, particularly geography, sociology, and the humanities, contribute to the understanding and theorization of Islamist movements." READ MORE

Tariq Ramadan and the Quest for a Moderate Islam. Robert Carle. Society, Feb 2011, pp. 58-69. "Tariq Ramadan calls himself a bridge builder between Muslims and European culture, but contradictions in his theology prevent him from fulfilling this role. He is an Islamic intellectual who espouses democracy and pluralism, yet he believes that shari'a law is universal. He exhorts his European followers to refrain from anti-Semitic violence, yet he cites as an authority Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is an apologist for Palestinian suicide bombers. He calls for Muslims to be full participants in Western civic societies, yet he calls on Muslims to "resist" the neo-liberal economic order that forms the basis of Western society. Ramadan has made alliances with left wing politicians and academics in France, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States, but he has a pattern of disappointing and frustrating his leftist allies. In the wake of terrorist attacks in Britain and the Netherlands, the British and Dutch governments called upon Ramadan to support peaceable brands of Islam in these traumatized countries. These efforts failed because Ramadan's most important constituency has always been 'the Muslim street,' and this makes it difficult for him to embrace liberal principles." READ MORE

Ghosts of Fascists Past. Ian Kershaw, The National Interest, March-April 2011, var. pp. "A prominent British government minister, Baroness Warsi, herself a Muslim, claimed just recently that Islamophobia has “passed the dinner-table test” in Britain and is seen by many as normal and uncontroversial. She warned of growing intolerance, prejudice and bigotry toward the Muslim faith and its adherents. In reply, some religious and social commentators have suggested that growing numbers of Muslims in Britain give rise to legitimate concerns. [...] Though the comments of the minister related solely to Britain, there is little doubt that they could be replicated in many other European countries. If we add to the mix the anti-immigrant feeling that is widespread in many parts of the Continent, then racism, it has to be admitted, is far from eradicated. How dangerous is it, given these countries’ baleful histories of racism and fascism in the not-too-distant past? Not surprisingly, some have asked whether Europe is moving toward political extremes. Do the signs point that way? Is Europe indeed on the road to new racial intolerance that could give succor to the extremist Right and even offer it new, promising prospects?" READ MORE

You Too Can Be Awlaki! Jarret M. Brachman and Alix N. Levine, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2011, pp. 25-47. "Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric now hiding in Yemen, has combined religious doctrine with colloquial Western references to become the most popular terrorist among Western supporters. By using the Internet to brand himself as a user-friendly personality, al-Awlaki has repackaged al-Qaeda’s convoluted and inaccessible message into something that his followers are able to understand and replicate on their own. Terrorism expert Jarret Brachman and the Anti-Defamation League’s Alix Levine develop a model for understanding the process of online al-Qaeda mobilization and offer valuable insight on why—and when—this phenomenon becomes an actual security concern." READ MORE

In the Shadow of the Qur'an: Recent Islamist Discourse on the United States and US Foreign Policy. Sami Baroudi, Middle Eastern Studies, July 2010, pp. 569-594. "Academics have paid far more attention to Islamist movements than to the political discourse of contemporary Islamist authors. This is regrettable for four main reasons. First, Islamists address issues of major importance to their societies and these societies' relations with the external world, especially the West. Understanding their discourse holds the key to a better understanding of Islamist movements. Second, Islamists form an integral component of the Arab intelligentsia. As opinion shapers they influence the attitudes, beliefs and value systems of Arab publics. Third, Islamists have been writing extensively and critically about the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War. It is of great importance to understand why they are so 'preoccupied' with America and why they view it the way they do. Finally, Islamists write in a distinct style that leans heavily, and in complex ways, on the sacred text (the Qur'an). It is intriguing and intellectually stimulating to analyze the substance and style of their discourse and to contextualize it historically. This article focuses on one specific and critical aspect of contemporary Islamist discourse: its treatment of the United States." READ MORE

Building the Base: Al Qaeda's Focoist Strategy. Kenneth Payne, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, pp. 124-143. "Al Qaeda has developed a coherent strategy for insurgent violence that has much in common with the focoism advocated by Che Guevara in the 1960s. In their strategic writing, explored here, key Islamist strategists stress the role of violence in creating revolution, and describe the export of committed fighters to focoist enclaves at the margins of enemy control. In contrast to some prominent themes in recent scholarship, the article argues that physical space is demonstrably important to the revolutionaries, that their development of leaderless jihad is designed to supplement not replace territorial control, and that their violence is avowedly strategic." READ MORE

Beyond Our Reach. Adam B. Kushner, National Journal,  February 2011, var. pp. In the Middle East, both realpolitik and idealism have failed. It’s time to scale back our ambitions. Here is a truism: American foreign policy has always been torn between interests and ideals. That dichotomy long predates the popular uprisings roiling Egypt and Tunisia. It animated the Cold War debates over whether we should support democratically elected socialists or Western-aligned autocrats. Policymakers usually settled those disputes by judging what would be most advantageous to the United States, but even when Washington made a noble choice, as when Americans helped push out Filipino kleptocrat Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, things mostly worked out for us in the end. The world is filled with relatively stable nations we once meddled in, still friendly enough to the United States. They do not continue, in perpetuity, to serve up diplomatic, social, economic, and military crises. READ MORE

Ghosts of the ‘Arab Spring’.  James Kitfield. National Journal,  February 2011, var. pp.
To get Egypt right after Mubarak, the Obama administration needs to understand what went wrong with George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda.” [...] As President Obama takes his turn at aligning America with democratic movements that have swept through the Middle East—removing leaders in its wake—the short life and violent death of the 2005 Arab spring serves as an important cautionary tale. Understanding what went wrong then is critical to getting the current crisis right. READ MORE

The Rise and Fall of Political Reform in the Arab World. Marina Ottaway, Current History, December 2010, pp. 376-382.  "For a few years in the early 2000s the Arab world appeared to be entering a period of political reform without confrontation. In most countries, opposition groups were trying to use legal channels of political participation to increase their influence and force regimes to accept democracy. In countries with elected parliaments, all parties, including Islamist ones, showed more interest in taking part in elections. Even in Gulf countries without formally democratic institutions, pressure was increasing on governments to make room for at least partially elected parliaments or for municipal councils, or to allow “political societies” to operate even though parties were banned. Reformers both inside regimes and in the opposition emphasized strengthening representative institutions and increasing political participation, while trying to avoid defiance and conflict. Today, the hope for reform without confrontation has waned in most countries. Governments throughout the Arab world have abandoned the pretense of reform and are reconsolidating their grip on power. They are narrowing opportunities for political participation by manipulating laws and closing the space in which political parties can operate. Reform, it is increasingly clear, depends less on the design of formal processes and institutions than on power relations among factions within nations." READ MORE

Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Yemen. Sarah Phillips, Survival, February-March 2011, pp. 95–120. "Since the attempted bombing of an American passenger jet on Christmas Day 2009 was traced to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, the Yemeni government has been trying to convince foreign donors that it requires extraordinary financial assistance to stay afloat in the face of the al-Qaeda threat. The West is right to worry about Yemen's ability to contain the conflict that is intensifying within its borders and has responded with a set of policy prescriptions aimed at stabilising the regime. This approach, however, may actually aggravate Yemen's problems because it seeks to strengthen existing power hierarchies rather than find incentives to make the power elite more responsive to the crisis." READ MORE

The Cairo Conundrum. Shadi Hamid,  Democracy, Winter 2010, var. pages.  Hamid, director of research at Brookings Doha Center, confronted the dilemma facing the U.S. in Egypt. "Just as it did under the previous administration, America's relationship with Egypt both captures and magnifies the myriad contradictions of U.S. policy in the Middle East," he wrote. "It brings to a head the inescapable tensions that have long undermined its credibility in the region, tensions between ideals and interests, between America's desire for democracy and its need for stability." Hamid closed his piece with an exhortation: "In Egypt, an otherwise promising polity threatens to come apart. Egyptians, along with Arabs and Muslims throughout the region, have demonstrated their desire for substantive political change. It is time we did the same." READ MORE

Connecting the Actual with the Virtual: The Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim World—The Cases of Iran and Egypt. Melissa Y. Lerner, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, December 2010, pp 555–574. "The rapid expansion of Internet use in the Muslim world has called into question what roleif anythis medium can play in political action in these countries. This paper seeks to analyze the extent to which the Internet offers space for an expansion of social movement theory in the Muslim world. It relies on a number of case studies from two Muslim countries, the One Million Signatures Campaign and Weblogistan in Iran, and the Kefaya Movement and Muslim Brotherhood blogging in Egypt. When placing Internet use in the context of political scientist and historian Charles Tilly's repertoire of social movement characteristics (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) and political scientist Robert Putnam's theory that the Internet can isolate individual users, it appears that the key to the successful collaboration of the web and social movements is an adaptive dynamic, through which groups function in both the cyber-world and the real world. This paper presents a potential vision for the future of the Internet and Islamic activism based on the assumption that an online element will help generate some of the elements of Tilly's social movement repertoire, particularly if the Internet is used to inspire sympathetic individuals to real world political action." READ MORE

Preserving Non-Democracies: Leaders and State Institutions in the Middle East, Mehran Kamrava, Middle Eastern Studies, March 2010, pp. 251—270. "Authoritarian elites often prolong their tenure in office by engaging in wholesale institutional change. Whether inherited or created from scratch, state institutions in non-democracies are meant to solidify elite cohesion and political control, pacify potential opponents, and create coalitions that support the state. Nevertheless, autocrats keep a watchful eye on these institutions, and if they change internally in directions that may seem threatening to state leaders, the institutions are changed or even disbanded. Change to the institutions of the non-democratic state is caused by a combination of deliberate decisions and institutional crafting by state leaders on the one hand, and by institutional layering and changes initiated from within the institutions rhemselves on the other. As the cases of the National Assembly in Kuwait, the Revolutionary Command Council in Egypt, and the Revolutionary Council in Iran demonstrate, when and if state institutions become inefficient or are seen as a threat by authoritarian leaders, then state leaders once again take control in determining their shape and configuration. Non-democracies are often preserved through purposive institutional change." READ MORE