Nonproliferation - United States Nonproliferation Policy: a Dossier
"But no alliance can afford to stand still… The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War… Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked – that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. (Applause.) And as nuclear power – as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, "Yes, we can." (Applause.)" — President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009, Prague
“The United States is deeply committed to reducing nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear proliferation. Our long-term goal, our vision, is a world without nuclear weapons. Now, we understand this will be difficult and it will certainly take time. But we believe it is attainable if we tackle each piece of the problem step by step.” Secretary Clinton Remarks At the Conference on Disarmament, Feb. 28, 2011
Major US Government Statements
A select list of major statements with policy value.
Latest US Government Statements
The most recent statements in reverse chronological order.
Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence After New START. Source: U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2011.
-06/24/11 "Dirty Bombs": Background in Brief Source: CRS Report for Congress.
-06/24/11 "Dirty Bombs": Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress Source: CRS Report for Congress.
-06/21/11 Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues Source: CRS Report for Congress.
-06/17/11 North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation Source: CRS Report for Congress.
-06/10/11 Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues Source: CRS Report for Congress.
Financial Hardball: Corralling Terrorists and Proliferators Source: U.S. House Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, April 6, 2011
02/15/11 Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations Source: CRS Report for Congress
02/04/11 Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union Source: CRS Report for Congress
02/03/11 China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues Source: CRS Report for Congress
02/02/11 Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Source: CRS Report for Congress
01/20/11 North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues Source: CRS Report for Congress
01/18/11 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Source: CRS Report for Congress
01/13/11 Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues Source: CRS Report for Congress
01/11/11 Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer Source: CRS Report for Congress
01/11/11 U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress Source: CRS Report for Congress
THE NEW START TREATY (Treaty Doc. 111-5): BENEFITS AND RISKS Source: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010
THE NEW START TREATY (Treaty Doc. 111-5): IMPLEMENTATION—INSPECTIONS AND ASSISTANCE Source: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010
THE NEW START TREATY (Treaty Doc. 111-5): VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON Source: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010
THE NEW START TREATY (Treaty Doc. 111-5): THE NEGOTIATIONS Source: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010
To receive testimony on the New START and implications for national security programs. Source: U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, June 17, 2010
05/03/10 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications Source: CRS Report for Congress
05/03/10 The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
THE NEW START TREATY Source: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 18, 2010
Testimony on the United States nuclear weapons policy and force structure. Source: U.S. House, Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2010.
Opening Statement
Witnesses:
The Honorable James N. Miller, Ph.D. (pdf testimony)
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
U.S. Department of Defense
General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (pdf testimony)
Commander
U.S. Strategic Command
The Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino (pdf testimony)
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
U.S. Department of Energy
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher (pdf testimony)
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
U.S. Department of State
START Treaty and Protocol
Feature: Toward a Nuclear-Free Word
Nuclear Posture Review, Source: Department of Defense, April 6, 2010. “This review describes how the United States will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of a nuclear-free world.”
A World Free of Nuclear Weapons
Since the first atomic bombs exploded in 1945, some have tried to rid the world of nuclear weapons. President Obama has embraced this goal with new vigor. This issue of eJournal USA examines the challenges to achieving nuclear disarmament. It conveys the hopes of some thinkers, and explains the doubts of others. Source: EJournal, Dept of State, February 2010
01/08/10 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Source: CRS report for Congress
SIPRI Yearbook 2011. Source: SIPRI, June 7, 2011.
No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy. Michael S. Gerson, International Security, Fall 2010, pp. 7–47. "The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to 'put an end to Cold War thinking' and 'reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,' the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the 'sole purpose' of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack." READ MORE
Smaller and Safer. Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2010, pp. 9-15. "On April 8, sitting beside each other in Prague Castle, US Pres Barack Obama and Russian Pres Dmitry Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Just two days earlier, the Obama administration had issued its Nuclear Posture Review, only the third such comprehensive assessment of the US' nuclear strategy. The two countries' nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and sizable portions of their weapon systems, will still be poised for "launch on warning" -- ready to execute a mass firing of missiles before the quickest of potential enemy attacks could be carried out. A stable nuclear deterrent exists between the US and Russia when neither country would choose to launch a nuclear attack against the other regardless of the level of tension that may arise between them. A stable deterrent whole would thus be constructed from more vulnerable, de-alerted parts." READ MORE
Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement. Avner Cohen, Marvin Miller, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2010, pp. 30-44. "In the shadow of the Holocaust, Israel made a determined effort to acquire nuclear weapons. However, just as fear of genocide is the key to understanding Israel's nuclear resolve, that fear has also encouraged nuclear restraint. After all, if Israel's enemies also acquired the bomb, the Jewish state might well face destruction, given its small size and high population density. This combination of resolve and restraint led to a code of nuclear conduct that is fundamentally different from that of all other nuclear weapons states. The policy and practice of nuclear opacity was codified in 1969 in an extraordinary secret accord between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and US Pres Richard Nixon. In Israel, for government officials, security analysts, and even the general public, nuclear opacity is one of the Jewish state's greatest strategic and diplomatic success stories. In Israel, opacity is viewed almost universally as the most prudent response Israel could have fashioned to its nuclear dilemma." READ MORE
The Point of No Return. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Atlantic, September 2010, var. pp.
For the Obama administration, the prospect of a nuclearized Iran is dismal to contemplate— it would create major new national-security challenges and crush the president’s dream of ending nuclear proliferation. But the view from Jerusalem is still more dire: a nuclearized Iran represents, among other things, a threat to Israel’s very existence. In the gap between Washington’s and Jerusalem’s views of Iran lies the question: who, if anyone, will stop Iran before it goes nuclear, and how? As Washington and Jerusalem study each other intensely, here’s an inside look at the strategic calculations on both sides—and at how, if things remain on the current course, an Israeli air strike will unfold. READ MORE
A New Approach to Iran. The Need for Transformative Diplomacy. John Tirman, MIT Center for International Studies, July 2009. var. pp. The United States and Iran have been trapped in a cycle of hostility and aggression for three decades. President Barack Obama has said several times as a candidate and as president that he seeks to alter that dynamic and create a productive dialogue with Iran, and Iran’s leaders have made statements over the last several years along the same lines. Yet both countries find it immensely difficult to take the steps needed to create a productive relationship. The costs of not doing so are enormous. READ MORE NATO NUCLEAR POLICY AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY. Sam Nunn, Survival, April–May 2010, pp. 13–18. The revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2010 is an historic opportunity. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, NATO governments and publics will expect, if not demand, that the Alliance re-evaluate longstanding US and NATO nuclear declaratory policy, US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and the role of nuclear weapons in NATO security. For many years, I have made the case that reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is the most important issue in national security and foreign policy today. But progress on these issues cannot take place in the absence of progress on a much broader agenda, and that front includes NATO policies writ large, our relationship with Russia, and tangible cooperation among nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear threats. READ MORE NATO's EVOLVING PURPOSES AND THE NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT. David S. Yost, International Affairs, March 2010 pp. 489-522. Is there a conflict between the Alliance's original and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post-Cold War crisis management functions? This is an ill-framed debate, because the home base must be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The allies have, moreover, moved away from a static, reactive, and territorial concept of collective defence towards a more 'proactive' and 'anticipatory' approach. Some experts have even referred to a 'deterritorialization' of collective defence. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber warfare, space operations, the risk of state-sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency. Despite disagreements on how to pursue shared goals, the allies may yet demonstrate that they have the vision and political will to meet the new challenges. The question of the Alliance's 'level of ambition' in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed purposes and burden-sharing to achieve them. READ MORE PLANNING THE FUTURE U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE. National Institute for Public Policy, Comparative Strategy, January 2010, pp. 1-216. "One important set of issues concerns the purposes and qualities of the U.S. nuclear force best suited to contemporary security conditions. These are questions of force planning that bear directly on U.S. arms control, alliance, and non-proliferation policies. Given the potentially grave consequences of error, careful analysis should inform discussion and decisions concerning the future of the nuclear force." READ MORE RETHINKING THE NPT'S ROLE IN SECURITY: 2010 AND BEYOND. Rebecca Johnson, International Affairs, March 2010, pp. 429 "As the states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) plan for the May 2010 review conference, they are faced with recurring political challenges that call into question the long-term sustainability of the presently constituted non-proliferation regime, notwithstanding the important role the NPT and its related institutions have played in slowing the pace of proliferation for four decades. Even if the review conference is deemed a success, its outcome is unlikely to address the regime's core structural weaknesses and normative contradictions. Frustration with the continuing status and benefits accorded to nuclear-armed states outside as well as within the NPT, will continue to diminish confidence in the effectiveness of traditional non-proliferation and deterrence practices." READ MORE THE LONG ROAD TO ZERO. Charles D Ferguson, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010, pp. 86-94. "Over the past three years, a remarkable bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington regarding nuclear security. The new US nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, revitalizing a strategic dialogue with China, pushing for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, repairing the damaged nuclear nonproliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in weapons. In order to speed the reduction of its own nuclear arsenal and encourage other countries' disarmament, the US will have to confront three daunting obstacles: the insecurities of nations, including some currently protected under the US nuclear umbrella and others that see a nuclear capability as the answer to many of their security problems; the notion that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer in the realm of international relations; and the proliferation risk that inevitably arises whenever nuclear supplier states offer to build civilian reactors for nonnuclear states. READ MORE THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST: IS PROLIFERATION INEVITABLE? NCAFP, American Foreign Policy Interests, January 2010, pp. 26–35."The report that follows is a summary of a closed-door, off-the-record roundtable that was held in New York City on April 29, 2009. Just as the article begins with a letter from the president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), it closes with a postscript written in November 2009 by the senior fellow of the NCAFP's project on The Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace. Both testify to the panelists' commitments to answering the overarching question posed in the title of the roundtable and to identifying Iran's purpose in enriching its uranium." READ MORE
U.S. Government Links
- Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation U.S. Department of State
- National Nuclear Security Administration U.S. Department of Energy
