Harold Hongju Koh
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
Washington, DC
Thank you, Dean Areen, for that very generous introduction, and very special thanks to my good friends President Lucy Reed and Executive Director Betsy Andersen for the extraordinary work you do with the American Society of International Law. It has been such a great joy in my new position to be able to collaborate with the Society on so many issues.
As you saw, my client, Secretary Clinton very much wanted to be here in person, but as you see in the headlines, this week she has been called away to Mexico, to meeting visiting Pakistani dignitaries, to testify on Capitol Hill, and many other duties. As you can tell, she is very proud of the strong historical relationship between the American Society and the State Department, and she is determined to keep it strong. As the Secretary mentioned, I and another long time member of the Society, your former President Anne Marie Slaughter of the Policy Planning Staff join her every morning at her 8:45 am senior staff meeting, so the spirit of the American Society is very much in the room (and the smell of the Society as well, as I am usually there at that hour clutching my ASIL coffee mug!)
I. The Role of the Legal Adviser
First, my job. I have now been the Legal Adviser of the State Department for about nine months. This is a position I first heard of about 40 years ago, and it has struck me throughout my career as the most fascinating legal job in the U.S. Government. Now that I’ve actually been in the job for awhile, I have become even more convinced that that is true, for four reasons.
Second, I have extraordinary clients and you just saw one, Secretary Hillary Clinton, who is a remarkably able lawyer. Of course, another client of mine, the President, is also an outstanding lawyer, as are both Deputy Secretaries, the Department’s Counselor, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and a host of Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.
Third, each day we tackle extraordinarily fascinating legal questions. When I was a professor, I would spend a lot of time trying to think up exam questions. For those of you who are professors, this job literally presents you with a new exam question every single day. For example, I had never really thought about the question: “can you attach a panda?” Or the question, can Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi erect a tent in Englewood, New Jersey, notwithstanding a contrary local ordinance? To be honest, I had never really thought about those questions. But rest assured, in the future, many Yale law students will.
Fourth and finally, my position allows me to play extraordinary and varied roles. Some government lawyers have the privilege for example, of giving regular advice to a particularly prominent client or pleading particular cases before a particular court. But the Legal Adviser must shift back and forth constantly between four rich and varied roles: which I call counselor, conscience, defender of U.S. interests, and spokesperson for international law.
As Counselor, I mean obviously, that the Legal Adviser must play all the traditional functions of an agency general counsel, but with a twist. Like every in-house counsel’s office, we do buildings and acquisitions, but those buildings may well be in Afghanistan or Beijing. We review government contracts, but they may require contracting activities in Iraq or Pakistan. We review employment decisions, but with respect to employees with diplomatic and consular immunities or special visa problems.
But in addition to being counselors, we also serve as a conscience for the U.S. Government with regard to international law. The Legal Adviser, along with many others in policy as well as legal positions, offers opinions on both the wisdom and morality of proposed international actions. For it is the unique role of the Legal Adviser’s Office to coordinate and render authoritative legal advice for the State Department on international legal issues, or as Dick Bilder once put it, to “speak law to power.” In this role, the Legal Adviser must serve not only as a source of black letter advice to his clients, but more fundamentally, as a source of good judgment. That means that one of the most important roles of the Legal Adviser is to advise the Secretary when a policy option being proposed is “lawful but awful.” As Herman Pfleger, one former Legal Adviser, put it: “You should never say no to your client when the law and your conscience say yes; but you should never, ever say yes when your law and conscience say no.” And because my job is simply to provide the President and the Secretary of State with the very best legal advice that I can give them, I have felt little conflict with my past roles as a law professor, dean and human rights lawyer, because as my old professor, former legal adviser Abram Chayes, once put it: “There’s nothing wrong with a lawyer holding the United States to its own best standards and principles.”
A fourth and final role for the Legal Adviser, and the reason I’m here tonight, is to act as a spokesperson for the US Government about why international law matters. Many people don’t understand why obeying our international commitments is both right and smart, and that is a message that this Administration, and I as Legal Adviser, are committed to spreading.
To them I would answer that, of course, in foreign policy, from administration to administration, there will always be more continuity than change; you simply cannot turn the ship of state 360 degrees from administration to administration every four to eight years, nor should you. But, I would argue—and these are the core of my remarks today-- to say that is to understate the most important difference between this administration and the last: and that is with respect to its approach and attitude toward international law. The difference in that approach to international law I would argue is captured in an Emerging “Obama-Clinton Doctrine,” which is based on four commitments: to: 1. Principled Engagement; 2. Diplomacy as a Critical Element of Smart Power; 3. Strategic Multilateralism; and 4. the notion that Living Our Values Makes us Stronger and Safer, by Following Rules of Domestic and International Law; and Following Universal Standards, Not Double Standards.
As articulated by the President and Secretary Clinton, I believe the Obama/Clinton doctrine reflects these four core commitments. First, a Commitment to Principled Engagement: A powerful belief in the interdependence of the global community is a major theme for our President, whose father came from a Kenyan family and who as a child spent several years in Indonesia.
Second, a commitment to what Secretary Clinton calls “smart power”—a blend of principle and pragmatism” that makes “intelligent use of all means at our disposal,” including promotion of democracy, development, technology, and human rights and international law to place diplomacy at the vanguard of our foreign policy.
In this maze of bureaucratic politics, you are only one lawyer, and there is only so much that any one person can do. Collective government decision-making creates enormous coordination problems. We in the Legal Adviser’s Office are not the only lawyers in government: On any given issue, my office needs to reach consensus decisions with all of the other interested State Department bureaus, but our Department as a whole then needs to coordinate its positions not just with other government law offices, which include: our lawyer clients (POTUS/SecState/DepSecState); White House Lawyers (WHCounsel/NSC Legal Counsel/USTR General Counsel); DOD Lawyers (OGC, Jt Staff, CoComs, Services, JAGs); DOJ Lawyers (OLC, OSG, Litigating Divisions-Civ., Crim, OIL, NSD); IC Lawyers (DNI, CIA); DHS Lawyers, not to mention lawyers in the Senate and House.
To make matters even more complex, we participate in a complicated web of legal processes within processes: the policy process, the clearance process, the interagency process, the legislative process; and once a U.S. position is developed, an intergovernmental lawyering process. So unlike academics, who are accustomed to being individualists, in government you are necessarily part of a team. One obvious corollary to this is that as one government lawyer, your views and the views of your client are not the only views that matter. As Walter Dellinger observed when he worked at OLC:
"[U]nlike an academic lawyer, an executive branch attorney may have an obligation to work within a tradition of reasoned, executive branch precedent, memorialized in formal written opinions. Lawyers in the executive branch have thought and written for decades about the President’s legal authority… When lawyers who are now [in my office] begin to research an issue, they are not expected to turn to what I might have written or said in a floor discussion at a law professors’ convention. They are expected to look to the previous opinions of the Attorneys General and of heads of this office to develop and refine the executive branch’s legal positions."[2]
Now to say that is not to say that one administration cannot or should not reverse a previous administration’s legal positions. But what it does mean, as I noted at my confirmation hearings, is that government lawyers should begin with a presumption of stare decisis--that an existing interpretation of the Executive Branch should stand-- unless after careful review, a considered reexamination of the text, structure, legislative or negotiating history, purpose and practice under the treaty or statute firmly convinces us that a change to the prior interpretation is warranted.
So that is what I mean when I say it’s harder than it looks. And as those listening who have served in government know, it is a lot harder to get from a good idea to the implementation of that idea than those outside the government can imagine.
That brings me to my second, shorter story: about two Irishmen walking down the road near Galway. One of them asks the other, "So how do you get to Dublin?" And the other answers, "I wouldn't start from here."
In the same way, given the choice, no one would have started with what we inherited: the worst recession since the Depression, with conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, against al-Qaeda. Add to this mix a difficult and divided political environment, which makes it very difficult to get 60 Senate votes for cloture, much less the 67 you would need for treaty ratification, and such thorny carryover issues as resuming international engagement, closing Guantanamo, not to mention tackling an array of new challenges brought to us by the 21st century: climate change, attendant shifts in the polar environment; cyber crime, aggression and terrorism, food security, and global health just to name a few. Just to round things out, throw in a 7.0 earthquake in Haiti, another earthquake in Chile, four feet of snow in Washington, and you might well say to yourselves, to coin a phrase, “I wouldn’t start from here.”
A. International Justice and Dispute Resolution
By international justice and dispute resolution, I refer to the U.S.’s renewed relationship to international tribunals and other international bodies. Let me address two of them: the International Criminal Court and the U.N. Human Rights Council. As President Obama recognized, “a new era of engagement has begun and renewed respect for international law and institutions is critical if we are to resume American leadership in a new global century.”
With respect to the U.S. relationship to the ICC, let me report on my recent participation in the Resumed 8th Session of ICC Assembly of States Parties in New York, from which I have just returned. Last November, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Stephen Rapp and I led an interagency delegation that resumed engagement with the Court by attending a meeting of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP). This was the first time that the United States had attended such a meeting, and this week’s New York meeting continued that November session. As you know, the United States is not party to the Rome Statute, but we have attended these meetings as an observer. Our goal in November was to listen and learn, and by listening to gain a better understanding of the issues being considered by the ASP and of the workings of the International Criminal Court.
Significantly, although during the last decade the U.S. was largely absent from the ICC, our historic commitment to the cause of international justice has remained strong. As you all know, we have not been silent in the face of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As one of the vigorous supporters of the work of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, the United States has worked for decades, and we will continue to work, with other States to ensure accountability on behalf of victims of such crimes. But as some of those ad hoc war crimes tribunals enter their final years, the eyes of the world are increasingly turned toward the ICC. At the end of May, the United States will attend the ASP’s Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda. There are two key items on the agenda: stock-taking and aggression.
First, there are questions raised by the terms of the definition itself, including the degree to which it may depart from customary international law of both the “crime of aggression” and the state “act of aggression.” This encompasses questions like what does it mean when the current draft definition requires that an act of aggression must be a “manifest” –as opposed to an “egregious” violation of the U.N. Charter?
A second question of who decides. The United States believes that investigation or prosecution of the crime of aggression should not take place absent a determination by the U.N. Security Council that aggression has occurred. The U.N. Charter confers on the Security Council the responsibility for determining when aggression has taken place. We are concerned by the confusion that might arise if more than one institution were legally empowered to make such a determination in the same case, especially since these bodies, under the current proposal, would be applying different definitions of aggression.
Third, there are questions about how such a crime would potentially affect the Court at this point in its development. For example, how would the still-maturing Court be affected if its prosecutor were mandated to investigate and prosecute this crime, which by its very nature, even if perfectly defined, would inevitably be seen as political--both by those who are charged, as well as by those who believe aggressors have been wrongly left uncharged? To what extent would the availability of such a charge place burdens on the prosecutor in every case, both those in which he chooses to charge aggression and those in which he does not? If you think of the Court as a wobbly bicycle that is finally starting to move forward, is this frankly more weight than the bicycle can bear?
Fourth, would adopting the crime of aggression at this time advance or hinder the key goals of the stock-taking exercise: promoting complementarity, cooperation, and universality? With respect to complementarity, how would this principle apply to a crime of aggression? Do we want national courts to pass judgment on public acts of foreign states that are elements of the crime of aggression? Would adding at this time a crime that would run against heads of state and senior leaders enhance or obstruct the prospects for state cooperation with the Court? And will moving to adopt this highly politicized crime at a time when there is genuine disagreement on such issues enhance the prospects for universal adherence to the Rome Statute?
All of these questions go to our ultimate concern: has a genuine consensus yet emerged to finalize a definition of the crime of aggression? What outcome in Kampala will truly strengthen the Court at this critical moment in its history? What we heard at the Resumed Session in New York is that no clear consensus has yet emerged on many of these questions. Because this is such a momentous decision for this institution, which would bring about such an organic change in the Court’s work, that we believe that we should leave no stone unturned in search of genuine consensus. And we look forward to discussing these important issues with as many States Parties and Non States Parties as possible between now and what we hope will be a successful Review Conference in Kampala.
You know the history: In March 2006, the U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to replace the flawed Human Rights Commission with this new body: the Human Rights Council. The last Administration participated actively in the negotiations in New York to reform the Commission, but ultimately voted against adoption of the UNGA resolution that created the HRC, and decided not to run for a seat.
The UNGA resolution that created the HRC made a number of important changes from the commission process: it created the Universal Periodic Review process, a mandatory process of self-examination and peer review that requires each U.N. member state to defend its own record before the HRC every four years. The Obama Administration would like our report to serve as a model for the world. Accordingly, we are preparing our first UPR report, which will be presented this November, with outreach sessions in an unprecedented interagency listening tour being conducted in about ten locations around the United States to hear about human rights concerns from civil society, community leaders, and tribal governments. Second, the HRC and its various subsidiary bodies and mechanisms meet far more frequently throughout the year than did the Commission, a pace that exhausts delegations. Third, the election criteria were revised. So while HRC membership still includes a number of authoritarian regimes that do not respect human rights, the election requirement of a majority of UNGA votes in often competitive elections has led to certain countries being defeated for membership and others declining to run for a seat. The rule that only one-third of membership (16 members) can convene a special session, has led to a disproportionate number of special sessions dedicated to criticism of Israel, which already is the only country with a permanent agenda item dedicated to examination of its human rights practices: an unbalanced focus that we have clearly and consistently criticized.
Let me focus the balance of my remarks on that aspect of my job that I call “The Law of 9/11.” In this area, as in the other areas of our work, we believe, in the President’s words, that “living our values doesn’t make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger.”
With this background, let me address a question on many of your minds: how has this Administration determined to conduct these armed conflicts and to defend our national security, consistent with its abiding commitment to international law? Let there be no doubt: the Obama Administration is firmly committed to complying with all applicable law, including the laws of war, in all aspects of these ongoing armed conflicts. As the President reaffirmed in his Nobel Prize Lecture, “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct … [E]ven as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules … the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is the source of our strength.” We in the Obama Administration have worked hard since we entered office to ensure that we conduct all aspects of these armed conflicts – in particular, detention operations, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects – in a manner consistent not just with the applicable laws of war, but also with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Let me say a word about each: detention, targeting, and prosecution.
1. Detention
a. Treatment
To ensure humane treatment, on his second full day in office, the President unequivocally banned the use of torture as an instrument of U.S. policy, a commitment that he has repeatedly reaffirmed in the months since. He directed that executive officials could no longer rely upon the Justice Department OLC opinions that had permitted practices that I consider to be torture and cruel treatment -- many of which he later disclosed publicly -- and he instructed that henceforth, all interrogations of detainees must be conducted in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and with the revised Army Field Manual. An interagency review of U.S. interrogation practices later advised – and the President agreed – that no techniques beyond those in the Army Field Manual (and traditional noncoercive FBI techniques) are necessary to conduct effective interrogations. That Interrogation and Transfer Task Force also issued a set of recommendations to help ensure that the United States will not transfer individuals to face torture. The President also revoked Executive Order 13440, which had interpreted particular provisions of Common Article 3, and restored the meaning of those provisions to the way they have traditionally been understood in international law. The President ordered CIA “black sites” closed and directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct an immediate review – with two follow-up visits by a blue ribbon task force of former government officials – to ensure that the conditions of detention at Guantanamo fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Last December, I visited Guantanamo, a place I had visited several times over the last two decades, and I believe that the conditions I observed are humane and meet Geneva Conventions standards.
Some have asked what legal basis we have for continuing to detain those held on Guantanamo and at Bagram. But as a matter of both international and domestic law, the legal framework is well-established. As a matter of international law, our detention operations rest on three legal foundations. First, we continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake armed attacks against the United States. Second, in Afghanistan, we work as partners with a consenting host government. And third, the United Nations Security Council has, through a series of successive resolutions, authorized the use of “all necessary measures” by the NATO countries constituting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to fulfill their mandate in Afghanistan. As a nation at war, we must comply with the laws of war, but detention of enemy belligerents to prevent them from returning to hostilities is a well-recognized feature of the conduct of armed conflict, as the drafters of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II recognized and as our own Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
The federal courts have confirmed our legal authority to detain in the Guantanamo habeas cases, but the Administration is not asserting an unlimited detention authority. For example, with regard to individuals detained at Guantanamo, we explained in a March 13, 2009 habeas filing before the DC federal court --and repeatedly in habeas cases since -- that we are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute – the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) – as informed by the principles of the laws of war. Our detention authority in Afghanistan comes from the same source.
Second, unlike the last administration, as a matter of international law, this Administration has expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of our detention authority. Both in our internal decisions about specific Guantanamo detainees, and before the courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF as informed by the laws of war. Those laws of war were designed primarily for traditional armed conflicts among states, not conflicts against a diffuse, difficult-to-identify terrorist enemy, therefore construing what is “necessary and appropriate” under the AUMF requires some “translation,” or analogizing principles from the laws of war governing traditional international conflicts.
Some commentators have criticized our decision to detain certain individuals based on their membership in a non-state armed group. But as those of you who follow the Guantanamo habeas litigation know, we have defended this position based on the AUMF, as informed by the text, structure, and history of the Geneva Conventions and other sources of the laws of war. Moreover, while the various judges who have considered these arguments have taken issue with certain points, they have accepted the overall proposition that individuals who are part of an organized armed group like al-Qaeda can be subject to law of war detention for the duration of the current conflict. In sum, we have based our authority to detain not on conclusory labels, like "enemy combatant," but on whether the factual record in the particular case meets the legal standard. This includes, but is not limited to, whether an individual joined with or became part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated forces, which can be demonstrated by relevant evidence of formal or functional membership, which may include an oath of loyalty, training with al-Qaeda, or taking positions with enemy forces. Often these factors operate in combination. While we disagree with the International Committee of the Red Cross on some of the particulars, our general approach of looking at “functional” membership in an armed group has been endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH).
- First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and
- Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces-- including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles-- great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.
First, some have suggested that the very act of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law. During World War II, for example, American aviators tracked and shot down the airplane carrying the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who was also the leader of enemy forces in the Battle of Midway. This was a lawful operation then, and would be if conducted today. Indeed, targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.
Second, some have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-- such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-- so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. Indeed, using such advanced technologies can ensure both that the best intelligence is available for planning operations, and that civilian casualties are minimized in carrying out such operations.
Fourth and finally, some have argued that our targeting practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute “assassination.”
In sum, let me repeat: as in the area of detention operations, this Administration is committed to ensuring that the targeting practices that I have described are lawful.
The same goes, third and finally, for our policy of prosecutions. As the President made clear in his May 2009 National Archives speech, we have a national security interest in trying terrorists, either before Article III courts or military commissions, and in keeping the number of individuals detained under the laws of war low.
Obviously, the choice between Article III courts and military commissions must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts of each particular case. Many acts of terrorism committed in the context of an armed conflict can constitute both war crimes and violations of our Federal criminal law, and they can be prosecuted in either federal courts or military commissions. As the last Administration found, those who have violated American criminal laws can be successfully tried in federal courts, for example, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and a number of others.
In closing, in the last year, this Administration has pursued principled engagement with the ICC and the Human Rights Council, and has reaffirmed its commitment to international law with respect to all three aspects of the armed conflicts in which we find ourselves: detention, targeting and prosecution. While these are not all we want to achieve, neither are they small accomplishments. As the President said in his Nobel Lecture, “I have reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is hard.” As President Obama went on to say, even in this day and age war is sometimes justified, but “this truth”, he said, “must coexist with another – that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier's courage and sacrifice is full of glory … But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths – that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly.”
Although it is not always easy, I see my job as an international lawyer in this Administration as reconciling these truths around a thoroughgoing commitment to the rule of law. That is the commitment I made to the President and the Secretary when I took this job with an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. That is a commitment that I make to myself every day that I am a government lawyer. And that is a commitment that I make to each of you, as a lawyer deeply committed—as we all are—to the goals and aspirations of this American Society of International Law.
Thank you.
[1] Jim Bouton, Ball Four: My Life and Hard Times Throwing the Knuckleball in the Big Leagues 30 (1970).
[2] Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 107 (1995).






