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Journal Articles
Disclaimer: The materials in this section are from sources outside the U.S. Government and should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein or as official U.S. policy.
NATO NUCLEAR POLICY AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY. Sam Nunn, Survival, April–May 2010, pp. 13–18. The revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2010 is an historic opportunity. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, NATO governments and publics will expect, if not demand, that the Alliance re-evaluate longstanding US and NATO nuclear declaratory policy, US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and the role of nuclear weapons in NATO security. For many years, I have made the case that reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is the most important issue in national security and foreign policy today. But progress on these issues cannot take place in the absence of progress on a much broader agenda, and that front includes NATO policies writ large, our relationship with Russia, and tangible cooperation among nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear threats. READ MORE
NATO's EVOLVING PURPOSES AND THE NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT. David S. Yost, International Affairs, March 2010 pp. 489-522. Is there a conflict between the Alliance's original and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post-Cold War crisis management functions? This is an ill-framed debate, because the home base must be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The allies have, moreover, moved away from a static, reactive, and territorial concept of collective defence towards a more 'proactive' and 'anticipatory' approach. Some experts have even referred to a 'deterritorialization' of collective defence. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber warfare, space operations, the risk of state-sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency. Despite disagreements on how to pursue shared goals, the allies may yet demonstrate that they have the vision and political will to meet the new challenges. The question of the Alliance's 'level of ambition' in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed purposes and burden-sharing to achieve them. READ MORE
PLANNING THE FUTURE U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE. National Institute for Public Policy, Comparative Strategy, January 2010, pp. 1-216. "One important set of issues concerns the purposes and qualities of the U.S. nuclear force best suited to contemporary security conditions. These are questions of force planning that bear directly on U.S. arms control, alliance, and non-proliferation policies. Given the potentially grave consequences of error, careful analysis should inform discussion and decisions concerning the future of the nuclear force." READ MORE
RETHINKING THE NPT'S ROLE IN SECURITY: 2010 AND BEYOND. Rebecca Johnson, International Affairs, March 2010, pp. 429 "As the states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) plan for the May 2010 review conference, they are faced with recurring political challenges that call into question the long-term sustainability of the presently constituted non-proliferation regime, notwithstanding the important role the NPT and its related institutions have played in slowing the pace of proliferation for four decades. Even if the review conference is deemed a success, its outcome is unlikely to address the regime's core structural weaknesses and normative contradictions. Frustration with the continuing status and benefits accorded to nuclear-armed states outside as well as within the NPT, will continue to diminish confidence in the effectiveness of traditional non-proliferation and deterrence practices." READ MORE
THE LONG ROAD TO ZERO. Charles D Ferguson, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010, pp. 86-94. "Over the past three years, a remarkable bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington regarding nuclear security. The new US nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, revitalizing a strategic dialogue with China, pushing for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, repairing the damaged nuclear nonproliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in weapons. In order to speed the reduction of its own nuclear arsenal and encourage other countries' disarmament, the US will have to confront three daunting obstacles: the insecurities of nations, including some currently protected under the US nuclear umbrella and others that see a nuclear capability as the answer to many of their security problems; the notion that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer in the realm of international relations; and the proliferation risk that inevitably arises whenever nuclear supplier states offer to build civilian reactors for nonnuclear states. READ MORE
THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST: IS PROLIFERATION INEVITABLE? NCAFP, American Foreign Policy Interests, January 2010, pp. 26–35. "The report that follows is a summary of a closed-door, off-the-record roundtable that was held in New York City on April 29, 2009. Just as the article begins with a letter from the president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), it closes with a postscript written in November 2009 by the senior fellow of the NCAFP's project on The Middle East: Islamic Law and Peace. Both testify to the panelists' commitments to answering the overarching question posed in the title of the roundtable and to identifying Iran's purpose in enriching its uranium." READ MORE
IRAN'S GROWING WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS. David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, Arms Control Today, Dec 2009, pp. 6-14. "The crisis over Iran's growing nuclear weapons capabilities is rapidly reaching a critical point. Recent developments do not bode well for the prospect of successful negotiations that can end concerns about Iran's nuclear program, at least in the short term. These concerns center on two related questions: whether Iran can be prevented from using its nuclear program for weapons purposes, and how much confidence the United States and other countries can have in verification measures to ensure that the Iranians are not using their program for such purposes." READ MORE
THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: CAN JAPAN LIVE
WITHOUT THE BOMB? Masaru Tamamoto, World Policy Journal, Fall
2009, pp. 63-70. "Clearly, a world free of nuclear
weapons is a step-by-step process. It will take many years for the
US and Russia--not to mention China or North Korea--to decommission
their arsenals. But politicians in Japan fear, for the first time,
that these moves are likely to cloud the clarity of America's
commitment to defend the nation. Japan, which has foresworn
offensive military capability since World War II and remains so
reliant on a foreign protector, is deeply fearful of abandonment.
Here, Tamamoto looks at whether Japan can live without nuclear
weapons."
READ MORE
NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION? Steven E. Miller, Scott D. Sagan, Daedalus,
Fall 2009, pp. 7–18. ""The global nuclear order is
changing. Concerns about climate change, the volatility of oil
prices, and the security of energy supplies have contributed to a
widespread and still-growing interest in the future use of nuclear
power. This surge of interest in nuclear energy–labeled by some
proponents as “the renaissance in nuclear power”– is, moreover,
occurring simultaneously with mounting concern about the health of
the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that
constrains and governs the world’s civil and military-related
nuclear affairs."
READ MORE
NUCLEAR POWER IN THE ARAB WORLD & THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE: AN EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE. Mohamed I. Shaker, Daedalus, Winter 2010, pp. 93–104. "Nuclear Technology Review 2009 also reported that a number of Arab countries are interested in the introduction of nuclear power. A quick tour d’horizon of the Arab world, from east to west, reveals some facts and developments concerning nuclear technology and its affiliations in this vast area of the world, which constitutes 10.2 percent of the entire globe." READ MORE
THE NUCLEAR "RENAISSANCE" & PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT & REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES: A RUSSIAN VIEW. Anatoly S. Diyakov, Daedalus, Winter 2010, pp. 117–125. "Concerns about sharp growth in oil and natural gas prices and shortages of fossil fuel reserves have led many countries, including developing countries, to express interest in nuclear power. An additional factor contributing to the growth of interest in nuclear power is essential improvements in reactor technology. Since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, for example, the reliability and efficiency of nuclear power plants (npps) have grown substantially. Russia is among the countries that are pursuing very ambitious programs of nuclear power development." READ MORE
NUCLEAR DISORDER. Graham Allison,
Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010, pp. 74-85. "The global
nuclear order today could be as fragile as the global financial
order was two years ago, when conventional wisdom declared it to be
sound, stable, and resilient. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, a confrontation that he thought had one chance in
three of ending in nuclear war, US Pres John F. Kennedy concluded
that the nuclear order of the time posed unacceptable risks to
mankind. The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, and
the three most urgent challenges to it are North Korea, Iran, and
Pakistan. If North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons
states over the next several years, the nonproliferation regime will
have been hollowed out. Most of the foreign policy community has
still not absorbed the facts about North Korean developments over
the past eight years. One of the poorest and most isolated states on
earth, North Korea had at most two bombs' worth of plutonium in
2001."
READ MORE
SAME AS IT EVER WAS: NUCLEAR ALARMISM, PROLIFERATION, AND THE COLD WAR. Francis J Gavin, International Security, Winter 2010, pp. 7-37. "A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled 'nuclear alarmism,' is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today's nuclear threats are new and more dangerous than those of the past. Second, unlike today, nuclear weapons stabilized international politics during the Cold War, when in fact the record was mixed. The third myth conflates the history of the nuclear arms race with the geopolitical and ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, creating an oversimplified and misguided portrayal of the Cold War. The final myth is that the Cold War bipolar military rivalry was the only force driving nuclear proliferation. A better understanding of this history, and, in particular, of how and why the international community escaped calamity during a far more dangerous time against ruthless and powerful adversaries, can produce more effective U.S. policies than those proposed by the nuclear alarmists." READ MORE
THE PUZZLE OF TRUSTING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Jan Ruzicka, Nicholas J. Wheeler, International Affairs, January 2010, pp. 69-85. "A successful outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is widely seen as vital if the NPT is to continue to play an important role in preventing nuclear proliferation. Focusing on the concept of trust, this article offers a novel perspective on the treaty and its future prospects. Too often dismissed as impossible or dangerous in international politics, trust has received little attention from both academics and practitioners. This article challenges this predominant view by making a case that the NPT establishes and embodies a series of trusting relationships between states." READ MORE
NUCLEAR POWER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. A Adamantiades, I Kessides, Energy Policy, December 2009, pp. 5149-5166. "Interest in nuclear power has been revived as a result of volatile fossil fuel prices, concerns about the security of energy supplies, and global climate change. This paper describes the current status and future plans for expansion of nuclear power, the advances in nuclear reactor technology, and their impacts on the associated risks and performance of nuclear power. Advanced nuclear reactors have been designed to be simpler and safer, and to have lower costs than currently operating reactors. By addressing many of the public health and safety risks that plagued the industry since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, these reactors may help break the current deadlock over nuclear power. In that case, nuclear power could make a significant contribution towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, significant issues persist, fueling reservations among the public and many decision makers. Nuclear safety, disposal of radioactive wastes, and proliferation of nuclear explosives need to be addressed in an effective and credible way if the necessary public support is to be obtained." READ MORE
ORGANIZATIONAL INTEREST, NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENTISTS, AND NONPROLIFERATION. Sharon K Weiner, Political Science Quarterly,Winter 2009/2010, pp. 655-680. "In the early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to concerns about proliferation, including fears about the spread of nuclear weapons expertise. In the US, the response was the creation of several programs to fight proliferation by providing income to former Soviet nuclear weapons workers. Two such efforts were located in the US Department of Energy. Both focused on a two-pronged response: improve experts' living standards in the short term and re-direct them to non-weapons jobs in the future. Here, Weiner looks at two cooperative threat reduction programs between the US and Russia that were aimed at the proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise. She asserts that the organizational interests of the US nuclear weapons laboratories--key actors in these programs--are responsible for early success but, in the long term, have led to concerns that have limited program effectiveness." READ MORE
REDUCING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. Miles Pomper, Survival, February 2010, pp. 75-96. Control of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons has remained an elusive goal since the end of the Cold War, despite the fact that these weapons are particularly attractive to nuclear terrorists and represent a major danger from the standpoint of early or accidental use. Meaningful progress will probably require a larger deal in which there are trade-off between US concessions on issues of interest to Russia and Russian concessions on tactical nuclear weapons. Two options merit serious consideration. The first entails the withdrawal of the small number of US tactical weapons that remain in Europe to jump-start a dialogue. The second option involves a package deal that would include Russian agreement to initiate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons reductions in exchange for NATO agreement to discuss changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. An optimal approach would be to launch a meaningful dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons in a separate forum, yet in parallel to the next stage of START negotiations. READ MORE
IDENTITY AND SECURITIZATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIVERGENCE OF RESPONSE TO INDIA AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. Jarrod Hayes, International Studies Quarterly, December 2009, pp. 977-1000. "With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the US response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play an important role in how security policy is constructed. In policy terms, if the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard." READ MORE
