United States policy toward Afghanistan: a Dossier

Journal Articles

Disclaimer: The materials in this section are from sources outside the U.S. Government and should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein or as official U.S. policy.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST: THE TALIBAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AL-QAEDA.  Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, Jane's Intelligence Review, Jan 2010, pp.18-23. "Despite clear differences in their stated aims and operational practices, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain allies against the ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright examine their alliance and consider why the two organisations retain such close ties." READ MORE

FROM HOPE TO AUDACITY APPRAISING OBAMA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Foreign Affairs, December 2009, var. pages. "Barack Obama’s foreign policy has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs. Three urgent issues -- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the Afghan-Pakistani challenge -- will test his ability to significantly change U.S. policy." READ MORE

OBAMA'S YEAR ONE: A SYMPOSIUM. Robert Kagan, Charles Lane & Ed. Pilkington. World Affairs, Jan/Feb 2010, var pages. "Robert Kagan, Contra: President Obama's policies toward Afghanistan and Iran—or lack thereof—have received more attention than any other issues. Charles Lane, Medius: If Obama's campaign promised anything, it was to "rebrand" the USA. Ed Pilkington, Pro: When Barack Obama stepped out onto the stage in Chicago's Grant Park last November, the atmosphere was filled with the hope that had been his campaign's watchword." READ MORE

THE TERROR FRINGE. Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, Policy Review, December 2009/January 2010, var. pp.  "The Afghan-Pakistan border region is widely identified as a haven for jihadi extremists. But the joint between local insurgencies and global terrorism has been dislocated. A combination of new technologies and new ideologies has changed the role of popular support: In local insurgencies the population may still be the 'terrain' on which resistance is thriving — and counterinsurgency, by creating security for the people, may still succeed locally. But Islamic violent extremism in its global and ambitious form is attractive only for groups at the outer edge, the flat end of a popular support curve. Jihad failed to muster mass support, but it is stable at the margin of society. Neither the West nor its enemies can win — or lose — a war on terror. Western anti-terror policy rests on the assumption that the threat of violent extremism has to be treated at the root — in Afghanistan. A stable Afghan-Pakistan border region, the theory goes, would stop exporting terrorism to the rest of the world." READ MORE

FORUM: PROGRESS, DISSENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY: AN EXCHANGE. Gian Gentile, Thomas Rid, et al. Survival, December 2009, pp. 189–202. "In the August-September 2009 issue of Survival (vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 31-48), Philipp Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton argued that the US military's change to a counterinsurgency posture in the on-going conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq was catalysed by two products of an institutional culture that strove to be self-learning: the response of junior leadership to tactical problems and senior institutional dissidents driving deep, controversial changes in doctrine and culture. In this Survival Exchange two experts offer US and European perspectives on the authors' argument and recommendations to preserve and advance this dynamic in anticipation of future requirements for rapid change. A response from Rotmann, Tohn and Wharton concludes the debate." READ MORE

TROTSKY IN BALUCHISTAN. Ahmed Rashid, National Interest, Nov/Dec 2009, var. pages. "Afghanistan is in crisis. Unless we redouble our efforts, the Taliban will take Kabul and throw the entire region into chaos. The group has already spread its influence throughout Pakistan and central Asia, inspiring Islamic militants to wage war against autocratic, corrupt and unstable regimes. For the Taliban believes that if jihad is to succeed in Afghanistan, Kabul can only be the first of many victories." READ MORE

PAKISTAN'S WAR WITHIN. C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, Survival, December 2009, pp. 161-188. "Prior to 2001, Pakistan had limited experience countering domestic militants. Today, the Pakistani army still prefers to focus on a potential war with India rather than against sub-state actors. Nonetheless, there have been noted improvements since 2001, and throughout 2009 Islamabad has demonstrated increasing resolve to defeat militants challenging the writ of the state. Earlier operations such as Al Mizan revealed serious deficiencies in the ability to conduct cordon-and-search operations and to hold territory. In the later operations in Bajaur and Swat, however, the Frontier Corps and army forces showed an improved capability to clear territory and integrate operations with local tribes. But Pakistani doctrine remains inconsistent with recent population-centric innovations in counter-insurgency warfare. Pakistan's commitment to a conventional orientation and the hardware most appropriate for fighting India has poorly equipped it to deal with the burgeoning domestic threat." READ MORE

STABILIZATION & RECONSTRUCTION OF NATIONS AFTER MILITARY CONFLICT: AFGHANISTAN AND CHECHNYA CASE STUDIES. Major Dan Fayutkin, Comparative Strategy, Fall 2009, pp. 367-372. "This article focuses on an analysis of two very different approaches for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) used by the United States in Afghanistan and the Russian Federation in Chechnya. The article discusses 'Stabilization and Reconstruction' (S&R) according to military doctrines, the possibility of the S&R of the nation, the doctrinal framework for S&R processes. The Russian Federation focused its S&R policy on rebuilding the security structures in Chechnya in order to guarantee a stable security situation in the Chechen Republic. The U.S. S&R effort revolved around the reconstruction of all the security, social and financial structures of a society based on democratic principles The significant lesson from the Afghanistan and Chechnya experiences is that it is necessary to build-up the legitimate local security and social structures, which will control the situation." READ MORE

EXIT LESSONS. David M. Edelstein, The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 2009, var. pp. "The results of such a study are chastening. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been very active in the world, but it has had no monopoly on large-scale intervention. [...] The debate over exit strategies originated in America's painful experience during the Vietnam War, which led some foreign-policy thinkers to conclude that an exit plan should be a prerequisite for any military intervention. The debate intensified in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, as the United States undertook interventions that appeared to be matters of choice more than necessity. In laying down what came to be called the Powell Doctrine, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell included an exit strategy on his list of conditions that should be met before the United States committed forces overseas. But from Somalia to the Balkans and Haiti, none of the subsequent conflicts to which U.S. forces were committed in the 1990s met this condition, much less Powell's chief principle that interventions must be directly tied to the long-term security of American interests. These costly and inconclusive efforts led critics to put even greater emphasis on questions about how the story was going to end. " READ MORE

IN AFGHANISTAN, TRAINING UP IS HARD TO DO. Sydney Freedberg Jr.  National Journal, 23 October 2009, var. pp. "In an article profiling the commander of the 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the author notes that training Afghan soldiers will require more American advisors and troops, in order to reverse the years of underinvestment in security in Afghanistan after 2003. Freedberg writes that Afghanistan became an afterthought, with most of the attention on Iraq; as a result, the situation in Afghanistan today is probably worse than it was in Iraq several years ago. As U.S. experience in Iraq has shown, it is difficult to separate the advisory role from the fighting; American troops are necessary to serve alongside the Afghans in order to reduce the threat to a level where the Afghans can handle it on their own." READ MORE

AFGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, Survival, October 2009, pp. 47 - 67. "US President Barack Obama's current policy favours escalation in Afghanistan. The idea is that as the United States' military presence in Iraq is drawn down, the use of force can be refocused on Afghanistan to forge a more viable state. The principal instruments of this policy are more American troops with better force protection (a customised version of the counter-insurgency 'surge' employed with ostensible success in Iraq) and firmer bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan. The administration's policy appears to be overdetermined. The premise of the policy is that the United States must 'own' Afghanistan in order to defend its strategic interests. But that premise begs the question of whether US strategic interests actually require the United States to assume the grand and onerous responsibility of rebuilding the Afghan state. They do not." READ MORE

AFGHANISTAN DILEMMA: IS PRESIDENT OBAMA PURSUING THE RIGHT COURSE?Thomas J. Billitteri, The CQ Researcher, August 7, 2009, pp. 669-692. "Nearly eight years ago, U.S. forces first entered Afghanistan to pursue the al Qaeda terrorists who plotted the Sept. 11 terror attacks. American troops are still there today, along with thousands of NATO forces. Under a new strategy crafted by the Obama administration, military leaders are trying to deny terrorists a permanent foothold in the impoverished Central Asian country and in neighboring, nuclear-armed Pakistan, whose western border region has become a sanctuary for Taliban and al Qaeda forces. The Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict — 'Af-Pak' in diplomatic parlance — poses huge challenges ranging from rampant corruption within Afghanistan's police forces to a multibillion-dollar opium economy that funds the insurgency. But those problems pale in comparison with the ultimate nightmare scenario: Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, which foreign-policy experts say has become a real possibility." READ MORE

PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: BEYOND THE TALIBAN. Juan Cole, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2009, pp. 221-249. The author "analyzes political and economic developments in contemporary Pakistan and Afghanistan. He argues that Western preoccupation with 'crisis' and 'radicalism' in Pakistan has caused observers to miss the success of an expanding white-collar middle class in demanding a rule of law and a return to civilian rule after nearly a decade of military dictatorship. He questions the idea that there is a purely military, and especially Western military, solution to the problem of Talibanism in northwest Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, analyzing the insurgency as several distinct groups driven in part by religious nationalism and anti-imperialism." READ MORE

THE COST OF PEACE. Joel Hafvenstein, Commonweal, Aug 14, 2009, pp. 16-19. "The Obama administration is clearly determined to reverse Afghanistan's slide into chaos. Since January 2009 we have seen a new military commander and ambassador in Afghanistan, a re-examination of strategy, and the beginnings of a 'surge' in American troops and civilian development workers. America's Afghanistan campaign, however, needs a more fundamental shift in priorities." READ MORE

FLIPPING THE TALIBAN. FILE. Christia Fotini and Michael Semple, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, var. pages. "President Barack Obama's proposed deployment of 21,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan is necessary to tip the balance of power against the Taliban. But it will not be enough. Washington and its allies must accompany the move with a political "surge," an effort to persuade large groups of insurgents to give up their fight. This can be done: in Afghanistan, battles are often decided by defections rather than fighting, and for many members of the Taliban, the insurgency is less a matter of ideology than a way of life."  READ MORE

THE LONG MARCH: BULDING AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY. Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, et al. RAND, May 2009, var. pages. "The Afghan National Army (ANA) is critical to the success of the allied efforts in Afghanistan and the ultimate stability of the national government. This monograph assesses the ANA's progress in the areas of recruitment, training, facilities, and operational capability. It draws on a variety of sources: in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past several years. Although the ANA has come a long way since the outset of the recent conflict in the country, the authors conclude that coalition forces, especially those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces and other illegally armed criminal groups." READ MORE

THE DANGERS OF DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT IN COUNTERTERRORISM. Tara Maller,  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, June 2009, pp. 511-536. "This article assesses the utility of diplomatic sanctions in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Through an examination of the United States' use of diplomatic sanctions in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 1990s, the article argues that diplomatic disengagement runs the danger of being more costly than beneficial. The blowback from diplomatic disengagement in counterterrorism includes, but is not limited to, the loss of valuable intelligence, a diminished public diplomacy capability, and the potential radicalization of moderates in the target regime. The article also highlights some of the general benefits of diplomatic engagement with problematic regimes and closes with recommendations aimed at enhancing the role of diplomacy in both counterterrorism and non-proliferation foreign policies."  READ MORE

IS IT WORTH IT? THE DIFFICULT CASE FOR WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. Stephen Biddle,  The American Interest, July-August 2009, pp. 4-11. The war in Afghanistan has been nearly invisible to the American public since its initial combat phase ended in early 2002, but it has rapidly come once again into view. Indeed, the war is now poised to become perhaps the most controversial and divisive issue in U.S. defense policy. Managing this war will pose difficult problems both in Afghanistan and here at home. The strategic case for waging war is stronger than that for disengaging, but not by much: The war is a close call on the merits. The stakes for the United States are largely indirect; it will be an expensive war to wage; like most wars, its outcome is uncertain; even success is unlikely to yield a modern, prosperous Switzerland of the Hindu Kush; and as a counterinsurgency campaign its conduct is likely to increase losses and violence in the short term in exchange for a chance at stability in the longer term." READ MORE

ENHANCING THE FOOTPRINT: STAKEHOLDERS IN AGHAN RECONSTRUCTION. Bas Rietjens, Myriame Bollen, Masood Khalil, and Sayed Fazlullah Wahidi, Parameters, Spring 2009, pp. 22-39. "Two of the authors are Afghans and members of nongovernmental organizations working with various local, national, and international groups within Afghanistan. Their article provides readers with greater understanding of the reconstruction mission of the International Security Assistance Force that is so essential to the process that bridges the gap between conflict and stabilization. The authors caution that reconstruction projects that overlook the dynamics associated with the local population are doomed for failure because they ignore the basic rationale and understanding of individual needs that support the requirement for peace in Afghanistan. READ MORE

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE PEACE PROCESS IN PAKISTAN. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, American Foreign Policy Interests, May 2009, pp. 149–165. "The phenomenon of the Pakistani government's negotiated peace settlements with Taliban militants may seriously endanger stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas, simultaneously lending tremendous strength to the Taliban and Al Qaeda movements. The United States has raised serious reservations about this peace process, which it sees as a beacon for militants to regroup, resulting in renewed insurgency and terror attacks in Afghanistan and the Western Hemisphere in general. This article attempts to contextualize both the peace process negotiated by the Pakistani government with the militants and the policy of the United States regarding the process. Projections for a successful counterinsurgency policy are articulated at the empirical level." READ MORE

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: COMPETING NUCLEAR STRATEGIES AND DOCTRINES. Vernie Liebl, Comparative Strategy, April 2009, pp. 154-163. "India and Pakistan have now been nuclear powers for at least a decade, apparently already having 'gone to the brink' several times. Despite the dire potentialities of nuclear exchange, both countries pursue very specific nuclear deterrent and response strategies. These strategies can be found in their doctrinal development, how they articulate that doctrine and affiliated 'red lines,' and deployment of nuclear weapons delivery means and associated systems (such as antiballistic missiles systems and satellites)." READ MORE

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM WITH PAKISTAN? Stephen P. Cohen, C. Christine Fair, Sumit Ganguly, Shaun Gregory, Aqil Shah, Ashley J. Tellis. Foreign Affairs roundtable, var. pages. "A Foreign Affairs roundtable discussion on the causes of instability in Pakistan and what, if anything, can be done about them." READ MORE

MUSHARRAF AND PAKISTAN: DEMOCRACY POSTPONED. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp. 94-118. "Following a 1999 coup, Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf ruled by decree with the support of the military. He held a presidential referendum and got his party elected. He amended the constitution to legitimize his military rule. His involvement in the war on terrorism led to the rise of religious extremism, and he persuaded the United States to propose a power-sharing plan. In 2007, Musharraf got himself re-elected by the outgoing parliament, an election subsequently challenged in court. In November, he declared a state of emergency and dismissed Supreme Court justices whom he feared would rule against him. Under external pressure, he ended the emergency after he had secured the presidency and resigned from the military. In 2008, opposition parties won the parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government. They have not yet reinstated the dismissed judges. They forced Musharraf to resign, but more steps are needed to complete the transition to a true democracy." READ MORE

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN PAKISTAN? Hilary Synnott, Survival, February–March 2009, pp. 61-80. "The challenges in southwestern Asia need to be considered in three separate but related contexts: Afghanistan, the Afghan–Pakistani tribal belt, and Pakistan. In the present conjuncture, Pakistan is arguably the most important of the three. With nuclear weapons and a huge army, a population over five times that of Afghanistan, and simultaneous security, political and economic crises, it now seems less able, without outside help, to muddle through its challenges than at any time since its war with India in 1971." READ MORE

TIME FOR SOBER REALISM: RENEGOTIATING RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. C. Christine Fair, The Washington Quarterly, April 2009, pp. 149 172. "The United States has failed to achieve all but minimal progress toward most of its objectives with Pakistan. Pakistan’s intentions and security perceptions are the crux of the problem, and U.S. policy must significantly change to address them." READ MORE

RETHINKING U.S. POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. Federico Manfredi, World Policy Journal, Winter 2008/09, pp. 23–30. "A new U.S. president is about to inherit the deepening crisis in Afghanistan. As the war enters its eighth year, the United States is striving to regain momentum, increasing troop levels, and stepping up military operations to subdue a resurgent Taliban movement and stabilize the floundering Afghan government. These efforts enjoy solid bipartisan support. Indeed, the general consensus in Washington is that the war in Afghanistan remains a legitimate cause that is crucial to the U.S. national interest—a 'good war' well worth a reinvigorated commitment. However, President Barack Obama should rethink the conventional wisdom. While the invasion of Afghanistan made sense in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the current nation-building-cum-counterinsurgency enterprise is an unnecessary burden that the United States can and should abandon." READ MORE

THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN: THREE VIEWS. Barnett R. Rubin; Amin Saikal; Julian Lindley-French, Survival, February-March 2009, pp. 1,83—96. "The situation in Afghanistan has turned so far against the United States, NATO, the international community, and those Afghans who originally hoped that the post-11 September 2001 intervention would finally bring them a chance for normal lives, that it will be very difficult to salvage. Al-Qaeda has established a new safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, from which it supports insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan and continues its global planning against the United States and its allies." READ MORE

NATO: THE UNITED STATES, TRANSFORMATION AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. Mark Webber, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, January 2009, pp. 46-63. "During the Bush years, NATO exhibited in stark form two trends which have long characterised its development: periodic exposure to crisis and division, and a subordination to American leadership. Despite signs of American indifference towards the alliance, talk of the Bush administration levering a break with NATO was always overstated, particularly so during its second term of office. Views of NATO after 2004 were shaped by Afghanistan giving rise, in fact, to a return to the alliance on America’s part. NATO remains important to Bush’s successor but on terms which are as demanding as those of his predecessors. NATO, in other words, is valued in so far as it accords with current US foreign policy priorities. The safest assumption in this regard is that Obama will continue to favour the trend towards a global NATO pursued by the Bush administration. However, retreat (or defeat) in Afghanistan could hasten a contrary trend towards a consolidating NATO with a renewed concentration on the wider Europe." READ MORE

HOW TO WIN A LOSING WAR.  Nathaniel C. Fick and John A. Nagl, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2009, var. pages.  “Two years ago, a controversial military manual rewrote U.S. strategy in Iraq. Now, the doctrine’s simple, yet powerful tenets—radical, to some—must be applied to the far different and neglected conflict in Afghanistan.” READ MORE Plus, an exclusive interview with Gen. David Petraeus